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KILLING AND CLEANING IN COMBAT: A PROPOSAL TO
EXTEND THE FOREIGN CLAIMS ACT TO COMPENSATE
FOR LONG-TERM ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE
MARK D. SAMEIT*
INTRODUCTION
Like it or not, warfare has been a constant throughout human
history.1 As technology has progressed, so too has the destruction wrought
by warfare on the environment.2 With the introduction of nuclear
weapons at the end of World War II,' the possibility of near-permanent
environmental damage became real, and the need to contain mankind's
methods of warfare became evident.4
Following World War II, the threat of mutually assured destruction
prevented any global environmental catastrophes;5 however, true inter-
national concern over the impact of war on the environment did not begin
* Mark D. Sameit is a 2008 J.D. candidate at the William & Mary School of Law and a
Captain in the United States Marine Corps. All of the views in this Note are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Military. The author
would like to thank his fiancee Meredith Lee May for all her help in researching and
editing this Note. Additionally, the author would like to thank Jan Abbott for her im-
measurable support throughout the year and the entire editorial staff for their support,
assistance and time in preparing three issues, and this Note, for publication.
1See generally JAREDM. DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS & STEEL (1999) (recounting the develop-
ment of civilization and warfare).
2 See infra Part I (recounting a brief history of warfare's destructiveness).
'See generally Mystery in the Desert, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 22, 1999, at 30 (providing a brief
history of the development of nuclear weapons).
4 See SAMUEL GLAsSToNE & PHILIP J. DOLAN, THE EFFECTS OF NuCLEAR WEAPONS 387-450
(3d ed. 1977), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-globsec/publications/effects/effects
.shtml (outlining the contamination from radioactive fallout); see also Hyun S. Lee, Post
Trusteeship Environmental Accountability: Case of PCB Contamination on the Marshall
Islands, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLy 399,405-08 (1998) (discussing the history of nuclear
weapons testing and the permanent destruction of some Marshall islands).
' See generally Owen Matthews, Russian Nukes Redux; Looking to Recapture Lost Glory,
Moscow is Building a New Nuclear Warhead Designed to Evade U.S. Defenses, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 13, 2006, at 10 (inferring that the threat of mutually assured destruction prevented
nuclear warfare and that the U.S. building of nuclear missile defenses upsets that balance
of power).
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until the Vietnam War.6 Vietnam brought the issue to light because it
corresponded with the rise of the environmental movement in the United
States. Vietnam also foreshadowed the possibility of greater environmen-
tal disasters if countries continued to modify or destroy the environment
as a method of warfare.' In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the inter-
national community recognized the need for environmentally conscious
treaties and negotiated numerous agreements with the specific intent of
protecting the environment.8
Since the Vietnam War, the environment has been a major issue
of contention in the United States in almost every conflict.9 While the
United States Military is constantly attempting to adapt to ever-changing
societal environmental norms, criticism still abounds. Today, environ-
mental groups level three primary criticisms against the United States
Military: (1) the use of depleted uranium in its weapons; (2) the failure
rate of cluster bombs and its associated lethality, and; (3) the environ-
mental impact of the destruction of some of its targets. 10
This Note discusses the environmental problems faced in modern
warfare and the international attempts to limit the destruction of the envi-
ronment, and proposes a domestic solution through the Foreign Claims
Act. Part I of this Note lays out the historical background behind environ-
mental law in warfare with a special focus on the Vietnam War, which
triggered the first international attempts to limit warfare's effect on the
environment. Part I! discusses the international treaties in effect since
the Vietnam War that limit environmental destruction, including the
Environmental Modification Treaty, Additional Protocols I and II to the
Geneva Convention, and other weapons-specific treaties. Part III then
6 Michael N. Schmitt, Green War:An Assessment of the Environmental Law of International
Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1997).
7 ARTHUR H. WESTING, ECOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR 1
(1976).
'See Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Technique, opened for signature May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333 [hereinafter
ENMOD Treaty]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims in International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), adopted
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Protocol II].
'See Laurent R. Hourcle, Environmental Law of War, 25 VT. L. REV. 653, 657-58 (2001).
" See Pekka Haavisto, The International Responses to the Environmental Impacts of War:
Keynote Address, 17 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 570, 573-83 (2005).
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discusses the Foreign Claims Act, how it operates, and its current
limitations. Finally, Part IV proposes a modification to expand the Foreign
Claims Act to allow the military to compensate victims of long-term
environmental damage and incorporate environmental costs into its
decisionmaking. Part IV then applies this proposed modification to the
three largest environmental criticisms leveled against the United States
Military and articulates the potential long-term beneficial effects.
I. HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE
History is replete with familiar examples of environmental damage
during warfare. One of the earliest and most familiar examples of envi-
ronmental warfare was the Romans salting the fields of Carthage during
the Third Punic War in 146 B.C." Likewise in 1346 A.D., the Tartars im-
plemented the first large-scale use of biological warfare by catapulting
plague-infested bodies into the city of Kaffa. 2 During Napoleon's advance
on Moscow, Russian citizens burned their own homes and the surrounding
forests to prevent the French army from obtaining supplies. 13 Sherman's
March to Atlanta during the American Civil War burned over four million
hectares, and the impact on the flora in Georgia is still visible today.14
World War II arguably saw the gravest damage to the environment
as countries fought by every available means. 5 The Chinese destroyed
their own Huayuankow Dam, flooded hundreds of thousands ofhectares,
and killed hundreds of thousands of their own citizens in an effort to stop
the Japanese onslaught." The Allied firebombing of Germany and Japan
left entire cities flattened and hundreds of thousands dead.'7 Even today,
" Frank R. Finch, This Land Is Our Land: The Environmental Threat ofArmy Operations,
in PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT 100, 102 (Grunawalt et
al. eds., 1996) (describing ancient examples of environmental warfare).
" Nahal Kazemi, Ill at Ease: The Precarious State of the Biological Weapons Convention's
Proposed Enforcement Regime, 17 FLA. J. INT'L L. 137, 143 (2005).
13 Marc A. Ross, Environmental Warfare and the Persian Gulf War: Possible Remedies to
Combat Intentional Destruction of the Environment, 10 DICK. J. INTL LAW 515, 517 (1992).
14 Finch, supra note 11, at 104.
" See generally Stephen Dycus, Nuclear War: Still the Gravest Threat to the Environment,
25 VT. L. REV. 753 (2001).
" Aaron Schwabach, Environmental Damage Resulting from the NATO Military Action
Against Yugoslavia, 25 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 117, 134 (2000).
" Mark J. Osiel, EverAgain: Legal Remembrance ofAdministrative Massacre, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 463, 553 n.343 (1995).
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the threat of unexploded ordnance exists throughout central Europe and
Japan from the round-the-clock Allied bombing of Axis cities and military
targets."5 Finally, the United States' use of the atomic bomb in the
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended the Second World War
but began a whole host of new environmental issues with the subsequent
arms race and above-ground nuclear testing.19
Vietnam saw both the pinnacle of military ingenuity in environ-
mental warfare and the beginning of domestic and international backlash
from the destruction of the environment.2 ° In order to combat Vietcong
guerilla tactics, the United States developed a number of tactics to reduce
enemy cover in the thick forests and slow down enemy troop movements.2'
These strategies decimated over ten percent of the total Vietnamese
jungles and left lasting effects that are still visible today.22
The United States' first and best known tactic was the dropping
of herbicides over South Vietnam in an effort to destroy the enemy's
cover for troop movement. This deforestation involved the now-infamous
"Agent Orange" as well as two other defoliates, Agents Blue and White.23
In addition to the well-documented health hazards of Agent Orange, 24 the
deforestation led to widespread soil erosion in the hilly areas of South
Vietnam and significant loss of animal habitats as the new flora could
not support the same animal life.25
" See Still Deadly: World War II Bombs, Modern Cluster Bombs, Landmines and Small
Arms, ATL. REV., Nov. 1, 2006, available at http://atlanticreview.org/archives/462-Still-
Deadly-World-War-II-Bombs,-Modem-Cluster-Bombs,-Landmines-and-Small-Arms.html;
World War II Bomb Clearance May Need 150 Years, CHINA DAILY, May 4,2005, available
at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-05/04/content_439409.htm.
19 See Dycus, supra note 15, at 754-55.
20 See S. Res. 71, 93d Cong. 15 (1973) [hereinafter Secret Hearings]. This has been
reprinted in Environmental Modification Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. On
Foreign Relations, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 101 (1978).
21 See WESTING, supra note 7 at 24.
22 Id. at 69-70 (discussing the damage and after-effects on indigenous flora); see also
Anthony Faiola, Vietnam's Toxic Legacy, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2006, available at http:l
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15692010/?GT1=8717 (discussing the effect dioxins from Agent
Orange are having on children thirty years after the war).23 See WESTING, supra note 7, at 24 (stating the United States dropped over seventy-two
million liters of herbicides across South Vietnam, including Agents Orange and White that
interrupt "the normal metabolism of poisoned plants" and Agent Blue that prevents a
plant from retaining moisture due to its desiccating compounds).
24 See Faiola, supra note 22.
25 WESTING, supra note 7, at 32 (discussing how animals are affected both by their loss
of habitat and by direct poisoning from the agents).
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The American military used another environmentally destructive
technique that involved heavy tractors with attached blades ("Rome
ploughs") to mow down vegetation alongside roads in an effort to prevent
ambushes.26 "All told, some [325,000 hectacres] were cleared by the Rome
ploughs in South Vietnam, that is, 2 per cent [sic] of its entire land area."27
The ecological consequences of clearing such a vast area included a loss of
habitat for local animals, flooding due to less absorbent soil, erosion of soil
and nutrients, and even a change in the surrounding microclimate.28
Arguably, the United States Military's most secretive and contro-
versial method of environmental warfare was seeding clouds to lengthen
the rainy season. The military conducted these operations during the dry
seasons from 1967 until 1972.29 The operations were intended to increase
the rainfall and make the primitive, unpaved roads of North Vietnam
unusable, thereby slowing the enemy and its supply train.3 ° A secondary
desired effect of modifying the rainfall was to tie up North Vietnamese
resources fixing flooded roads.3' The results of the secret project were in-
determinate; the Air Force believes it increased the rain by up to 30
percent in some areas.32 However, due to a lack of available ground
stations to measure the rainfall and other accurate data recording
methods, the Air Force admits the "results were certainly limited and
unverifiable.,33
In the midst of the politically divisive Vietnam War, the environ-
mental movement began to take hold in the United States as an issue that
united the whole country.34 On January 1, 1970, President Nixon signed
into law the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA), 35 one of the
first of many national environmental laws. Congress and the President
followed soon after with the creation of the Environmental Protection
Agency,36 the Clean Air Act Amendments 37 and the Clean Water Act
See id. at 46-49.
2 Id. at 47.
28 Id. at 48.
29 Secret Hearings, supra note 20, at 101.
3 0 Id. at 102.
3 1 1d.
32 Id. at 115.
31 Id. at 115, 120.
34 See Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of "Republican Moment" in Environmental
Law, 87 MINN. L. REV. 999, 1001-04 (2003).3
' National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2000)).
31 See Lazarus, supra note 34, at 1002.
" Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as
2008]
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Amendments.38 The momentum of the national legislation spilled over
into the international arena and the United States soon found itself
negotiating numerous international treaties regarding the environment.
II. INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES ON THE ENVIRONMENT
A. The Development of the International Law of War
Before discussing the current state of international environmental
law, it is necessary to discuss how international law came about. The
first attempts at developing a law of war involved bilateral treaties or the
unilateral adoption of a code of warfare by a country.39 Individual nations
quickly discovered that these treaties were ineffective and recognized
the need for truly international laws of war to regulate all countries and
all wars.4' The first major attempt to develop truly international law began
in 1864 with the convening of the first Geneva Diplomatic Conference.4'
This conference lead to the adoption of the First Geneva Convention on
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.42
Only four years later, the St. Petersburg Declaration renounced the
"employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of dis-
abled men, or render their death inevitable," as well as certain types of
exploding bullets.43
Eventually, two separate lines of treaty law developed from these
first attempts: "Hague Law" and "Geneva Law."' Hague Law developed
its name from the two peace conferences at the Hague in 1899 and 1907
that focused on limiting the means and methods of warfare similar to the
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000)).
" Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000)).
" Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of
Additional Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109, 112 (1986).
4 Id.
4 1 Id.
42First Geneva Convention on the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies
in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, 129 Consol. T.S. 361.
' Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297.
4 Roberts, supra note 39, at 113.
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St. Petersburg Declarations.45 The most important of these treaties was
the Convention Regarding Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV),
which regulated the means and methods of land warfare.46 Following
World War II, the world saw the need to further regulate the wartime
treatment of civilians, wounded and captured soldiers, and types of war-
fare that are particularly damaging to surrounding civilian populations.47
This realization lead to four separate agreements collectively known as
the Geneva Convention of 1949.48 Geneva law compliments Hague law
by defining who or what is a legitimate target of the means and methods
of warfare allowed by Hague law.49
B. International Customary Law of War
Four customary principles of the law of war developed from the
early Hague Law and apply today: necessity, proportionality, discrimina-
tion, and humanity.5" In order for a principle to become customary inter-
national law, there must be "evidence of a general practice accepted as law"
and it must reflect "the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations."" The underlying ideal behind these customary principles of the
law of war is that the means of engaging in warfare are not unlimited. 2
4 See First Peace Conference at the Hague, July 29, 1899, available at http://net.lib.byu
.edu/-rdh7/wwi/hague.html; Second Peace Conference at the Hague, Oct. 1907, available
at http://net.lib.byu.edu/-rdh7/wwi/hague.html.
4 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277.47 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
48 See supra note 47.
41 Schmitt, supra note 6, at 65-66.
" Carl E. Bruch & Jay E. Austin, The 1999 Kosovo Conflict: Unresolved Issues in
Addressing the Environmental Consequences of War, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.)
10,069, 10,075 (2000); Peter J. Richards & Michael N. Schmitt, Mars Meets Mother
Nature: Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1047,
1073-86 (1999).
"' Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 1(b),(c), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
52 See Schmitt, supra note 6, at 52.
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
The first customary principle that actors must always satisfy is
the principle of military necessity. It requires an aggressor to determine
whether it will gain an articulable military advantage from attacking a
target; if not, the aggressor may not attack.53 The intent of this principle
is to prevent long wars of arbitrary civilian attrition in an effort to win
a war. 4 This principle is perhaps best summarized in United States v.
List, one of the many post-World War II trials held at Nuremberg:
[Military necessity] does not permit the killing of innocent
inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the satisfaction of a
lust to kill. The destruction of property to be lawful must be
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Destruc-
tion as an end in itself is a violation of international law.
There must be some reasonable connection between the
destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy
forces.55
The conviction of the German commanders in List illustrates that the
principle of necessity requires the aggressor to demonstrate a nexus be-
tween the military advantage sought and the target selected.56
The second customary principle that actors must satisfy contem-
poraneously with necessity is proportionality. Proportionality can be
thought of best as a sliding scale of the military advantage gained versus
the humanitarian consequences." At some point on the scale, the damage
to the surrounding civilian population will outweigh the military advan-
tage gained, and the attack is deemed illegal under the principle of propor-
tionality. The difficulty in determining this exact point, where an attack
becomes illegal, is exacerbated by the differing values of human life in the
international forum. 9 Compounding this cultural difference is the fact
that values within a single society evolve over time. ° For example, prior
5 See Protocol I, supra note 8, at art. 52.
See generally id.
55United States v. List (The Hostage Case), reprinted in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1253-54 (1950).
56 Id.
5 See Hourcle, supra note 9, at 668.
See Richards & Schmitt, supra note 50, at 1082.
See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text (discussing the differing values of human
life when paying claims under the Foreign Claims Act).
60 See Richards & Schmitt, supra note 50, at 1083.
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to the Vietnam War, destruction of the environment was not considered
a major factor in the United States' proportionality analysis, but with the
rise of the environmental movement, the world community now evaluates
the environmental impact of different targets hit and the weapons used.s'
The third customary principle, discrimination, requires the means
of warfare to discriminate between legitimate military targets (as defined
by necessity and proportionality) and illegitimate civilian targets.62 A recent
example of attacks that likely violate the principle of discrimination were
Hezbollah's rocket attacks against cities in northern Israel.63 The
rockets were not guided and clearly did not discriminate between
legitimate military targets and illegitimate schools and hospitals. In
addition to indiscriminate attacks, the world community has banned
several weapons that it recognizes as incapable of discrimination,
including unmarked land-mines, booby traps, 4 and biological and
chemical weapons.65
The final principle of the customary law of war, humanity, pro-
tects against inhumane means and methods of warfare s.6 At the heart
of the principle of humanity is the ideal that there are certain "things
that civilized people just don't do." 7 This principle complements the other
three principles of discrimination, necessity and proportionality. In some
" See generally Part IV.B (discussing the criticisms raised against the United States for
the use of depleted uranium munitions, cluster bombs, and the effect of missed targets).
For an ongoing discussion of the efforts to improve or ban cluster munitions, see HRW
Documents on Cluster Bombs, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, available at http://www.hrw.org/
doc/?t=armsclusterbombs.
62 Hourcle, supra note 9, at 665-66.
63 See MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE JOAN B. KROC INST. FOR INT'L PEACE STUDIES, POLICY
BRIEF No. 12, PROPORTIONALITY AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 3 (2006),
available at http'/kroc.nd.edu/polbriefs/documents/polbriefl2.pdf(describing the rockets
as inaccurate and hitting civilian and military targets alike indiscriminately).
' United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol II, Oct. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1523 [hereinafter Conventional
Weapons Prohibition].
65 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972,
26.1 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 (reaffirming the world's commitment to banning
chemical and biological weapons and reducing national stockpiles); Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65
[hereinafter 1925 Protocol Against Chemical and Biological Weapons].
66 See Schmitt, supra note 6, at 61.
67 Id. at 62.
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instances, illegal acts can violate all four principles, such as destroying
food supplies to induce starvation and poisoning water supplies.6" Other
attacks, such as the use of incendiary devices to burn the enemy alive,
are illegal solely under the principle of humanity because of the vicious
effect on the enemy.69
The customary principles of the law of war can be used to protect
the environment as well as civilians. Attacks such as poisoning a town's
drinking water source or laying undocumented mine fields clearly have an
effect on both the environment and the civilian population. The customary
principles of the law of war can thus be used to protect the environment
as a byproduct of protecting the civilian population.7 °
While the customary principles of warfare set about a framework
for protecting the environment, the primary criticism of these principles
and international law in general are their overall lack of an enforcement
mechanism. 7' The United States clearly recognizes the customary prin-
ciples of warfare. 2 Mere recognition of an international principle is not
adequate; a foreign government wishing to bring a claim needs an inter-
national forum to hear the claim. The charter of the United Nations created
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") to hear these international
disputes,73 but the ICJ only has jurisdiction only if both parties to the
dispute consent to the Court's jurisdiction.74 In practice, the United
States has never consented to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, which leaves
complaining nations without a remedy.75
8 See id. at 61.
69See Conventional Weapons Prohibition, supra note 64, Protocol III. The United States is
not a party to this protocol, but is party to Protocols I and II.
70 William A. Wilcox, Jr., Environmental Protection in Combat, 17 S. ILL. U. L. J. 299,
303-04 (1993).
71 See Keith P. McManus, Civil Liability for Wartime Environmental Damage: Adapting
the United Nations Compensation Commission for the Iraq War, 33 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L.
REV. 417, 430-32 (2006).
72 See, e.g., United States v. List (The Hostage Case), reprinted in 11 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1253-54 (1950).
" ICJ Statute, supra note 51, art. 34.2; International Court of Justice, Rules of Court,
art. 1 (1978), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index!php?pl=4&p2=3&p3=0
[hereinafter Rules of Court].
7" Rules of Court, supra note 73, art. 38(5) (directing that a claim cannot be brought
against a nation under the ICJ unless the nation submits to the ICJ's authority).
71 See id.; see also, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 396-98 (Nov. 26), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/ 70/6485.pdf (demonstrating the United States rejecting the jurisdiction of
the ICJ in a claim brought by Nicaragua).
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In 2002, the United Nations created a second international court,
the International Criminal Court ("ICC"), to prosecute individuals instead
of states for "[tihe crime of genocide; [cirimes against humanity; [wiar
crimes; [and] [t]he crime of aggression."76 Environmental damage can be
characterized as either war crimes or crimes against humanity,7 so the
ICC could be used for environmental protection. Unfortunately, the United
States is not a party to the treaty establishing the ICC, which leaves the
Court lacking jurisdiction, and the claimant without a remedy.7"
C. Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention
In 1974, the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC")
convened the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development
of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. The
ICRC convened this conference because the nature and scale of warfare
was changing and the laws of war needed to be updated in response.79
This conference met four times between 1974 and 1977 and developed two
additional protocols to the Geneva Convention."° Protocol I is a mixture
of Hague and Geneva law and attempts to regulate international armed
conflict.8 ' Protocol II attempts to regulate human rights during non-
international conflict or civil war. 2
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention is the first formal
attempt to specifically prevent damage to the environment during war-
time. 3 It accomplishes this through three articles: 35(3), 55, and 56.
Article 55 follows traditional Hague and Geneva law because it prohibits
"widespread, long-term and severe damage" to the environment because
it "thereby... prejudice[s] the health or survival of the population." 4
" Rome Statute of the International Court, art. 5, opened for signature July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statue].
17 See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (discussing how violations of discrimi-
nation and humanity laws can be used to characterize environmental crimes as violating
the customary principles of war).
" See Rome Statute, supra note 76. A full list of countries that have ratified the ICC can
be found at the United Nations website, httpJ/untreaty.un.orgEnglish/bible/
englishinternetbiblepartI/chapterXVIII/treatyll.asp. The United States is not on the list.
71 See Schmitt, supra note 6, at 68-69.
80 id.
8
' Id. at 69.
92 See Protocol II, supra note 8.
ss See Protocol I, supra note 8, arts. 35(3), 55, 56.
4Id. at art. 55.
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Article 55 focuses on protecting the environment because of its effect on
the surrounding population. Article 35(3), on the other hand, prohibits the
"methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected,
to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environ-
ment.""5 Article 35(3) is unique because it protects the environment in its
own right, regardless of its effect on the surrounding population. Finally,
article 56 protects the environment by prohibiting attacks on "[wiorks or
installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nu-
clear electrical generating stations" to prevent releasing the forces and
"consequent severe losses among the civilian population." 6 The environ-
mental implications of attacks on these targets are clear and would likely
lead to violations of articles 35(3) and 55 as well because it would inten-
tionally cause "widespread, long-term and severe damage" to the natural
environment.8 7
Although Additional Protocol I provides protection to the environ-
ment during wartime, it does not clearly define the level of protection, and
the application of the treaty to the United States seems doubtful. The
terms "widespread, long-term and severe" are never defined in the treaty,
so the time frame and scale of damage necessary to violate the treaty are
open to debate. 8 Despite the definition problems, the United States signed
Additional Protocol I in 1978,9 but the Senate never ratified it, so the
United States is not party to the agreement.9 ° Even though the United
States did not ratify the treaty, the United States armed forces have cited
Additional Protocol I as customary law of war.9' Although this recognition
appears to strengthen environmental protection, the military clearly de-
85 Id. art. 35(3).
"6 Id. art. 56.
17 Id. arts. 35(3), 55.
88 Id.
8 9 See Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan to the U.S. Senate, Protocol
II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-international Conflicts, S. Treaty Doc. No. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
Agora: The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the
Protection of War Victims, 81 AM. J. INT'L. L. 910, 916 (1987).
90 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977: State
Parties, httpJ/www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Jan. 10,
2008).
9 1 UNITED STATEs ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 11 (2002) ("Furthermore, the U.S.
considers many of the provisions of the Protocols to be applicable as customary inter-
national law.") [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK (2002)].
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lineates that the United States takes exception to articles 35(3), 55, and
56.92 Ultimately, an attempt to protect the environment through the
enforcement against the United States of Additional Protocol I appears
doubtful at best.
D. Environmental Modification Treaty
The only treaty to which the United States is a party that directly
pertains to the environment in wartime is the Environmental Modification
Treaty ("ENMOD").93 The need for a treaty preventing the use of the envi-
ronment as a weapon was first proposed by the United States Senate in
the early 1970s. 94 This proposal was in response to top secret hearings
where the military admitted to using cloud seeding as an environmental
weapon against the North Vietnamese.95 The Soviet Union quickly agreed
to the need to limit this method of warfare, and after two years of nego-
tiation the United Nations General Assembly adopted the resolution in
1976.96
Unfortunately, the ENMOD treaty by its terms does not directly
provide significant environmental protection in wartime.97 It specifically
bans the use or modification of the environment as a weapon rather than
explicitly prohibiting environmental damage.9" Article I provides "(1) Each
State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any
other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having wide-
spread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage
or injury to any other State Party."99 The key terms "widespread," "long-
lasting" and "severe" are further defined in the Understanding related to
Article I: "(a) 'widespread': encompassing an area on the scale of several
hundred square kilometers; (b) 'long-lasting': lasting for a period of months,
or approximately a season; (c)'severe': involving serious or significant dis-
ruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other
92 id.
93 Although the Hague Law principles of proportionality and necessity deal indirectly with
with the environment, see supra notes 53-61, ENMOD is the only treaty ratified by the
United States that specifically mentions the environment.
"' See Secret Hearings, supra note 20, at 15.95 Id. at 21.
96 Id. at 2-5.
" See generally ENMOD Treaty, supra note 8.
98 See generally id.
99 Id. at 336.
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assets."' Examples of prohibited environmental modification techniques
include, but are not limited to, "earthquakes; tsunamis; an upset in the
ecological balance of a region; changes in weather patterns.., changes
in climate patterns; changes in ocean currents; changes in the state of the
ozone layer; and changes in the state of the ionosphere."'
One key change from Additional Protocol I, which was negotiated
contemporaneously with the ENMOD treaty, was the use of "or" rather
than "and" in the description of "widespread, long-lasting, or severe." °2
This change shows the lower threshold needed to prove an environmental
modification violation of international law compared to an environmental
damage violation under Protocol I.
From the outset, the ENMOD treaty received sharp criticism from
major environmental groups in the United States.'03 Environmental groups
believed the treaty was "illusory," with the primary substantive criticisms
as follows:
[A] sound Convention would prohibit all hostile environ-
mental modification techniques and activities, and such
a prohibition ought to apply with respect to any and all
uses, and the prohibition should not apply merely to use
against a party to the Convention. We also think that the
Convention ought to contain a verifiable prohibition on the
development and testing of environmental modification
techniques for hostile purposes.'
An additional concern was that the enforcement was left to the Security
Council and subject to the "crippling limitation" of a veto.10 ' Hence, any
permanent member of the Security Council could still use environmental
modification weapons and there would be no recourse if they chose to use
their veto. A final concern was that the treaty does not even prohibit the
'" Secret Hearings, supra note 20, at 11-12.
101 Id. at 12.
102 ENMOD, supra note 8, art. I; Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 55.
1os See Secret Hearings, supra note 20, at 36-46 (statement of Leonard C. Meeker, Director
of International Projects Center For Law and Social Policy, Washington, D.C., presenting
on behalf of the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club, the Environmental
Policy Center, the Wilderness Society and the Federation of American Scientists).
'04 Id. at 39.
105id.
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defoliation and weather modification tactics from the Vietnam War because
they do not qualify as widespread, long-lasting, or severe. 106
Much of the criticism was addressed in the Senate Resolution dis-
cussing the ratification of the treaty. First, the chairman made it clear that
after seven years of negotiation, this is the best compromise that can be
made between environmental protection and the military.0 7 If the treaty
were inclusive of all hostile environmental modification techniques, many
necessary military functions could bring about litigation. Examples include
an artillery bombardment that triggers a landslide or an avalanche, 0 8
dispelling fog to enable aerial resupply,109 and defoliating around a base
to provide for defensive lines-of-fire and observation. 0 Additionally, the
United States did not want to ban all research on environmental modifi-
cation techniques because there were several promising programs that had
great potential for peaceful purposes."' Finally, defoliation is arguably cov-
ered if it has widespread effects, as the foliage is part of the environment." 2
E. Other International Treaties Limiting Warfare
The United States is party to several other international treaties
banning the use of specific weapons during wartime. Chemical and bio-
logical weapons were banned in 1925,11' but the United States reserved a
right to respond in kind with chemical weapons." 4 The other major treaty
signed by the United States was a prohibition against certain weapons that
are excessively injurious against civilians." 5 The United States Senate
ratified Protocols I and II of this treaty, which prohibit fragmentation
weapons that cannot be detected by X-rays and limits the indiscriminate
use of land-mines that do not self-destruct." 6 The United States did not
106 Id. at 38.
16' Id. at 44.
0 8 Id. at 32.
109 Id. at 31.
110 UNITED STATES ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 194.
... See Secret Hearings, supra note 20, at 31 (describing programs that included
.precipitation enhancement" in dry areas and a program "trying to reduce the wind speed
in the eye of hurricanes").
112 See id. at 44.
113 See generally 1925 Protocol Against Chemical and Biological Weapons, supra note 65.
114 OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 91, at 15.
116 See generally Conventional Weapons Prohibition, supra note 64.
116 OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 110, at 16.
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ratify Protocols III and IV, which prohibit the use of incendiary weapons
and blinding lasers, respectively."
7
F. The Limitations of International Law in Protecting the
Environment During Wartime
Ultimately, if a country is looking for environmental protection
during wartime, international law has many shortcomings."' The cus-
tomary law of war provides a framework for arguing whether individual
actions or weapons violate the principle of necessity, proportionality,
humanity, or discrimination, but there is no international court with juris-
diction to hear these claims against the United States."9 The Environmen-
tal Modification Treaty merely prevents the use of the environment as
a means of war and does not accomplish the stated goal of protecting the
environment during wartime. 2 ° Finally, Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Convention provides a limited means of protecting against "long-
term, widespread, and severe" damage, but the United States is not a party
to the treaty and expresses direct reservations about the indefiniteness
of these very terms.'2'
Although these limitations of international law create difficulties
for a country to make a claim against the United States, should the United
States itself be concerned about environmental damage during wartime?
In the aftermath of the Iraq War, the United States faced a massive re-
building process in part because of the environmental damage inflicted
during the war.' 2 As of the end of February 2007, the Department of
Defense had disbursed over $10.6 billion to the Iraq Reconstruction and
Redevelopment Fund.'2' Additionally, the United Nations raised over
117 Id.
11' See supra Parts II.A-II.D.
See supra Part II.B.
120See supra Part II.D.
121 See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 91, at 11.
122 See U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME, ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL "HOT SPOTS" IN IRAQ
(2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IRFFI/64168382-1092419001661/
20891321]SpecialReport-UNEPIraqESA.pdf (presenting a detailed assessment of five
environmental "hot spots" after the war); Solana Pyne, Leaving a Mess in Mesopotamia,
THE VILL. VOICE, Apr. 2003, available at http:// www.villagevoice.com/news/0316,pyne,
43403,1.html.
123 DEP'T OF THE ARMY, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION REPORT 3 (2007) [hereinafter IRAQ
RECONSTRUCTION REPORT], available at http://www.grd.usace.army.mil/news/releases/
20070227.pdf.
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$1.2 billion from numerous countries including the United States to help
reconstruct Iraq.'24 The Iraqi government and supporting organizations
are using the funds for a wide range of environmentally-related projects
including rebuilding of the electric grid and health, water and sewage
programs.'25 While none of these projects are explicitly tied to wartime
environmental damage,'26 minimizing the environmental damage is intui-
tively in the economic interest of the United States so as to minimize the
burden on United States taxpayers.
In addition to the $11.8 billion spent by the United States and
various nations in the reconstruction of Iraq, some commentators argue
that the wartime damage to the electric power grid contributes to the
$400 billion cost of security in Iraq. 27
In the most recent survey... Iraqis were asked
which of 10 different problems 'requiring a political or gov-
ernmental solution' was most important to them. The first
choice, by a margin of about 10 percent, was 'inadequate
electricity.' 'National security' came in fifth; the 'presence
of multinational forces' was seventh; and 'terrorists' was
eighth.
A popular if not universal idea is that a more
robust electrical system would be a weapon against the
insurgency ....12
Fixing the electrical power system will not cure all of Iraq's security prob-
lems, but the survey demonstrates that it could go a long way to helping
build confidence in the fledgling government and improve security. 29
If the United States did want to create national legislation to
protect the environment of hostile countries during wartime, the Foreign
Claims Act provides a foundational model. The Foreign Claims Act provides
124 U.N. DEv. GROUP, IRAQ TRUST FUND GROSS DONOR COMMITMENTS AND DEPOSITS,
available at http://www.irffi.org/WBSITEEXTERNAIARFFI/0,,contentMDK=20316791-
pagePK64168627-piPK=64167475-theSitePK=491458,00.html (stating that the United
States contribution is $5 million of the total $1.26 billion).
125 IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION REPORT, supra note 123, at 3.
126 See id.
12 7 See, e.g., Martin Wolk, Cost of Iraq War Could Surpass $1 Trillion, MSNBC.COM, Mar. 17,
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11880954.
12 Glenn Zorpette, Re-engineering Iraq, IEEE SPECTRUM, Feb. 2006, available at http://
www.spectrum.ieee.org/feb06/2831.
129 See id.
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compensation for accidental damage to non-hostile foreign citizens paid
by the United States Military. 130 This Act forces the military to internalize
these accidental costs and recognize the price of its peaceful mistakes.
Extending this principle to environmental damage, the United States
Military could better measure the total cost of striking a target13 ' and
the true price of weapons' damage, including the environmental impact.132
III. NATIONAL LEGISLATION PROTECTING FOREIGN
CLAIMANTS-THE FOREIGN CLAIMS ACT
Congress established the Foreign Claims Act in 1942 "for the
purpose of promoting and maintaining friendly relations by the prompt
settlement of meritorious claims"133 for property loss or personal injury
of foreign nationals. Only non-combat incidences of the United States
Armed Forces fall within the scope of this Act. If the United States is
engaged in conflict within a country, the claimant must be "friendly to
the United States"134 and the action must not "result directly or indirectly
from an act of the armed forces of the United States in combat."135 There
is an exception to the combat exclusion if an aircraft has an accident or
malfunction en route to or returning from a combat mission. 36 Addition-
ally, the Secretary of Defense can waive the entire non-combat exclusion
of payments as was done after the 1983 invasion of Granada. 13
The Foreign Claims Act is quite expansive and covers damages by
civilian employees of the Department of Defense in addition to the mili-
tary.13 The Act is limited to actions under the Department of Defense as
evidenced by the Comptroller General's refusal to expand the Foreign
130 Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (West Supp. 2007).
131 See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the after-effects of bombing Pancevo industrial
complex).132 See infra Parts IV.B.2, IV.B.3 (discussing the effects of cluster munitions and depleted
uranium).
133 Foreign Claims Act, ch. 645, 55 Stat. 880 (1942) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a)
(West Supp. 2007)).
13 10 U.S.C. § 2734(b)(2) (2000).135 Id. § 2734(b)(3).
136 id.
137 See Lee Hockstader, In Panama, Civilian Deaths Remain an Issue; Months After
Invasion, Some Still Seek Compensation for Loved Ones Lost to U.S. Fire, WASH. POST,
Oct. 6, 1990, at A23.
138 See 10 U.S.C. § 2734(h) (2000).
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Claims Act to injuries created by the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development during times of war.139 Additionally, Congress placed
several limitations on the Foreign Claims Act, including a requirement
that no payments are made unless "the amount tendered is accepted by
the claimant in full satisfaction."4 ° Other requirements include a two-
year statute of limitations on all claims,' and the military's maximum
discretionary award is $100,000.142
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Foreign Claims Act is
that it is completely discretionary and not subject to judicial review.
Additionally, if a claim exceeds the $100,000 maximum allowed under
the Foreign Claims Act, the service secretary can pay up to $100,000 and
forward a request for the remainder to the Secretary of Treasury for pay-
ment subject to his or her certification.' In theory, this interplay of stat-
utes allows the appropriate service secretary and the Treasury Secretary
to pay a foreign claimant any amount of money at their joint discretion
without being subject to judicial review.
In practice, the Foreign Claims Act creates a host of challenging
legal, gender, and ethnic issues.145 The primary legal issue is determining
whether damages can be assessed under the Foreign Claims Act in the
country where the accident occurred. If the United States has a Status
of Forces Agreement with the country, such as countries in the North
American Treaty Organization ("NATO"), the international agreement
applies instead of the Foreign Claims Act. 46 If no international agree-
ment is in place, the military must apply local tort law and custom in
determining the appropriate value of damages. 47
139 See Claim of Hai Tha Truong, 64 Comp. Gen. 155 (1984).
140 10 U.S.C. § 2734(e) (2000).
141 Id. § 2734(b).
142 Id. § 2734(d).
'" See 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (West. Supp. 2007); Aaskov v. Aldridge, 695 F. Supp. 595, 599
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that the Secretary of the Air Force has the discretion to decide
whether not to settle a claim and cannot be ordered by a court to make a settlement).
144 10 U.S.C. § 2734(d); 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2000).
145 See Vanessa Blum, After the War, A Time to Pay: How JAG Lawyers Settle Foreign
Claims Over Noncombat Damage, LEGAL TIMES, April 1, 2003, at 1.
146 See, e.g., Aaskov, 695 F. Supp. at 596 (holding that a Danish citizen does not have a
claim under the Federal Claims Act, but rather under NATO Status of Forces Agreement
and the International Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2734a, 2734b (2000)).147 R. Peter Masterton, Managing a Claims Office, 2005 ARMY LAW. 29, 48 (2005); see also
Blum, supra note 145, at 16.
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Applying local law raises numerous difficult issues. For example,
in Somalia, a "man's life was valued at 100 camels and a woman's life at
[only] 50 [sic] camels." 45 The military determined camels cost approxi-
mately $100 during stable economic times and placed a maximum
$10,000 payout for death claims in Somalia.'49 Likewise, in Afghanistan,
the military used a valuation for a person's life similar to that used in
United States tort law, accounting for a person's age, future earnings,
and dependents. Applying this formula leads to payments of less than
$15,000 for the wrongful death of an Afghan. 150 Larger racial and ethical
issues begin to emerge in the application of the Foreign Claims Act when
one compares the meager payments for the loss of life in Somalia and
Afghanistan with the payment of $1,000,000 to an Australian woman for
brain damage incurred when hit by a golf ball. 5 '
IV. PROPOSAL TO EXTEND NATIONAL LEGISLATION TO PROTECT THE
ENVIRONMENT
A. Extending the Foreign Claims Act
Although the Foreign Claims Act is far from perfect,'52 it does
provide an otherwise unavailable means for foreign claimants to seek
redress for accidental military harms, and for military commanders to
track non-combat damages. Unfortunately, the Foreign Claims Act does
not presently provide a means to compensate for the environmental exter-
nalities of warfare previously identified."'5 The Secretary of Defense can
simply waive the non-combat requirement,154 but creating a series of one-
time exceptions would not force the military to internalize the future costs
of environmental damage into its planning.
If the United States Congress would require the military to plan
for environmental damage before the war, rather than paying for it after
" Blum, supra note 145, at 18.
149 id.
150 Id.
15 1 Id.
152 See Laura N. Pennelle, Comment, The Guantanamo Gap: Can Foreign Nationals Obtain
Redress for Prolonged Arbitrary Detention and Torture Suffered Outside the United States?,
36 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 303, 339-41 (2005) (discussing the many perceived problems of
obtaining relief under the Foreign Claims Act in Iraq).
'
53 See supra Part II.F.
154 See Hockstader, supra note 137, at A23.
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the war,15 the Foreign Claims Act provides an excellent model for the
military. The legislation could be easily expanded by complementing the
exception to the exclusion for aircraft accidents or malfunctions'56 with an
exception for environmental damage. Congress should restrict this to
environmental damage lasting more than one year5 7 and having a direct
impact on human health. This proposed modification would limit com-
pensation to only the most extreme cases where environmental damage
cannot be corrected within a year, while not creating unrealistic liability
for every crater on the battlefield. Additionally, payments for environ-
mental damage would still be at the Department of Defense's discretion
to account for scenarios where the United States does not have unques-
tioned air superiority or the ability to select targets and account for the
environment.158
Moreover, expanding the Foreign Claims Act to compensate for long-
term environmental damage would help to achieve the ultimate stated
goal of the Foreign Claims Act: "[t]o promote and to maintain friendly
relations" with other countries.'59 Other countries level three primary
environmental criticisms against the United States: the destruction of
environmentally sensitive targets, the high dud rate of cluster bombs, and
the use of depleted uranium. 16 0 Changing the Foreign Claims Act would
address these concerns and provide further benefits.
B. Environmental Criticisms
1. Selection of Targets: The Bombing of Pancevo
From March 24, 1999, through June 8, 1999, NATO forces hit the
Pancevo Industrial Complex in Serbia with missiles and bombs.'' These
strikes released numerous toxic chemicals into the environment, including
2,100 tons of Ethylene Dicholoride ("EDC"), eight tons of metallic mercury,
155 See IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION REPORT, supra note 123, at 3.
156 See 10 U.S.C. § 2734(b)(3) (2000).
157 See generally infra Part IV.B. 1 (arguing that the one-year minimum allows adequate
time to perform an environmental assessment and begin a cleanup operation).
.
58 See generally Faiola, supra note 22 (discussing how paying for the cleanup ofjust the
three largest "hot-spots" in Vietnam would cost over $60 million and ultimately it would
likely be cost prohibitive to clean the entire country).
159 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (West. Supp. 2007); Faiola, supra note 22.
160 See Haavisto, supra note 10, at 573-83.
"5l Uli Schmetzer, Serbs Allege NATO Raids Caused Toxic Catastrophe: Bombed Refineries,
Plants Spewed Stew of Poisons, They Say, CHIC. TRIB., July 8, 1999, at N1.
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460 tons of vinyl chloride monomer ("VCM"), 80,000 tons of oil and oil
products and 250 tons of liquid ammonia.' 62 The EDC, mercury, VCM, and
oil products threatened terrestrial and aquatic life, the health of the food
chain, and plant life in direct contact with the chemicals. 163 The Pancevo
site managers "released [the ammonia] into the open canal from the fer-
tiliser [sic] plant... fearful [that] a direct air strike on stored ammonia
could kill large numbers of people." 64 Recording stations in Pancevo re-
ported concentrations of VCM "10,600 times more than safe industrial
levels,"'65 and the mayor reported seeing black clouds of toxins in the sky
and white clouds of mixed poisons floating through the streets.'66
Despite being spared from the worst of the environmental effects
because the predominately westerly winds carried the toxins away from
the city, the citizens of Pancevo still suffered devastating effects.' 67 At least
one doctor reportedly advised all of his pregnant patients to have abortions
because of the potential effects of the toxins. 68 Fish in the neighboring
Danube river appeared "sluggish and sickly, with protruding bones and
bulging eyes."169 Local residents regularly complained of "respiratory
difficulties, burning eyes, choking sensations and upset stomachs." 70
Luckily for the citizens of Pancevo and the former Yugoslavia as a
whole, the United Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP") moved in
quickly after the war in an effort to identify environmental damage, clean
up "hot spots," and provide clean drinking water to affected areas.' 7 ' In
total, the cleanup efforts by UNEP in the Balkans cost over $12.5 million
and took four years to complete.'72 UNEP is not allocated this money
through general United Nations funds but rather must raise this money
162 U.N. ENVr PROGRAMME & U.N. CTR. FOR HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, THE Kosovo CONFLICT:
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT & HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 34 (1999), available at
http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/finalreport.pdf.163 Id. at 34-35.
' Id. at 35.
165 William Booth, A Ghost City of Mixed Poisons; NATO Bombs Left Site of Petrochemical
Complex a Toxic Slough, WASH. POST, July 21, 1999, at A15.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 See Schmetzer, supra note 161.
1
69
Id.
170Id.
171 U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME, FROM CONFLICT TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: ASSESSMENT
AND CLEAN-UP IN SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO 6 (2004) [hereinafter UNEP SERBIA CLEAN-UP],
available at http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/sam.pdf.
172 Press Release, U.N. Env't Programme, Conflict Hot Spots Cleaned Up (May 7, 2004),
available at http://postconflict.unep.ch/press.php?prog=serbia#serl.
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through a mixture of governmental and private donors.'73 Noticeably absent
from the list of governmental donors are NATO's two largest members,
the United States and the United Kingdom.' 4
UNEP focused the majority of its donor funds on cleaning up
Pancevo, the most heavily affected area. 175 Although the effort did lead
to significant environmental improvements and identification of future
projects, it lacked sufficient funds to remove all identified environmental
toxins from Pancevo's environment. 76 This was due to a combination of
wartime damage and preexisting environmental problems from inade-
quate waste treatment and environmental monitoring.'77 One major envi-
ronmental project remaining is dredging a heavily polluted waste water
canal filled with toxic levels of both mercury and mineral oils. 178 Ulti-
mately, UNEP turned the remaining cleanup efforts over to the Serbian
Government with safe drinking water, rehabilitated waste water treat-
ment facilities, and a plan for future environmental cleanup.179
Applying the proposed modifications to the Foreign Claims Act, the
Pancevo attack clearly created environmental damage lasting more than
one year with a direct impact on human health.' ° If the United States
truly desired "[t]o promote and to maintain friendly relations"' with other
countries, it is certainly counterintuitive to lead NATO air strikes 8 2 on
Pancevo and to refuse to contribute with other NATO countries in the
later environmental cleanup.' 3 By maintaining its refusal to fund envi-
ronmental cleanup efforts, the United States is, in effect, taxing other
environmentally minded countries without taking this into consideration
during its target selection."8 4
173 See UNEP SERBIA CLEAN-UP, supra note 171, at 10.
174 See id. at 10.
175 Id. at 32.
176 See id. at 32-37.
177 See id.
178 Id. at 36-37 (discussing that the pollution resulted from both preexisting sources and
from the Kosovo conflict).
17 9 See id. at 33, 50.
'
80 See id. at 32-37 (discussing the cleanup and the existence of toxic substances five years
after the attack).
181 Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (West Supp. 2007).
182 See generally Nato Leadership Splits Revealed, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Mar. 9, 2000,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/d/hi/europe/671420.stm (stating that the NATO air strikes were
lead by General Mike Short, United States Air Force, and that General Wesley Clark,
United States Army, was the Supreme Allied Commander).183 See UNEP SERBIA CLEAN-UP, supra note 171, at 10.
184 See generally Press Release, U.N. Env't Programme, Toxic Sites in Iraq to be Made
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The proposed legislation could potentially create beneficial effects
both preemptively and retroactively in the Pancevo example. The Depart-
ment of Defense does not have an unlimited budget,'15 so the military
must weigh the estimated cost of the cleanup if the site were bombed
against other options: doing nothing, destroying the roads accessing the
facility, capturing the facility, or another alternative. If the military chose
not to bomb the facility because of the estimated environmental costs,186
the United States benefits by averting the negative publicity of Pancevo.i1
7
Alternatively, if the United States decides the ultimate gains in bombing
Pancevo outweigh the potential costs, the military will have a ready report
justifying its decisionmaking, and the United States will not receive the
negative publicity of letting other countries pay for its environmental
decisions.18
2. Use of Cluster Bombs
The United States Military employs several types of combined
effect munitions ("CEM") depending on the range of the target. ' 9 The
three primary weapons for dispensing CEMs are the Tomahawk Land-
Attack Missile for long-range attacks launched from ships or submarines,19°
the Joint Standoff Weapon for medium-range attacks, and the Cluster
Bomb Unit ("CBU-87") for direct attacks. 19' Each CEM is filled with 150
to 200 "soda-can sized bomblet submunitions"'92 known as cluster bombs. 1
9 3
Safe (Nov. 10, 2005), available at http://www.unep.org(Documents.Multilingual/Default
.asp?DocumentID=457&ArticleID=5023&l=en (describing how Japan is funding UNEP
cleanup efforts in Iraq).
'85 See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008,
FINANIAL SuMMARYTABLES (2007), available at http'/www.dod.mil]comptroller/defbudget/
fy2008/fy2O08_summary-tableswhole.pdf.
186 See Booth, supra note 165, at A15 ("The complex was built in consultation with
engineers from the United States and Europe, and Mikovic said NATO airstrike planners
should have known what was in the storage tanks.").
187 See generally Schmetzer, supra note 161.
188 See UNEP SERBIA CLEAN-UP, supra note 171, at 10; Joan M. Mitric, Who's Going to Clean
Up Serbia?: The Environment as Prisoner of War, WASH. POST, July 9, 2000, at Bl.
189 See U.S. DEPT OF DEF., REPORT TO CONGRESS: KOSOVO/OPERATION AUIED FORCE AFTER-
ACTION REPORT 90 (2000) [hereinafter AFTER-ACTION REPORT], available at http://www
.dod.mil/pubs/kaar02072000.pdf.
'90 Id. at 92.
191 Id. at 90, 141.
192 Id. at 90.
193 Id.
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These bomblet submunitions are further filled with hundreds of pieces
of shrapnel that can cause injury at up to 150 meters. 94 The entire CEM
has an effective range of approximately 200 to 400 meters, 195 and is effec-
tive against a wide range of targets including enemy radar, personnel,
and tanks. 9
6
The primary danger and criticism of the cluster bomb is that it has
a 5 to 7percent dud rate,197 which leaves 10 to 14 unexploded bomblets
with each use.' When this seemingly small failure rate is multiplied by
the 1,100 CBU-87s used during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo' 99 and
the 1,210 CBU-87s used in Afghanistan,2 °° the magnitude of the problem
becomes apparent, with an estimated 11,000 unexploded ordnance in
Kosovo and 12,000 in Afghanistan.20 '
One factor amplifying the danger of the unexploded ordnance is
that the CBU-87 is not a precision-guided weapon. A CBU-87 can strike
over a kilometer away from its intended target.20 2 Additionally, the sub-
munitions have a tendency to burrow into the ground when they land on
soft soil.203 This causes the submunitions to become invisible to the naked
' Virgil Wiebe, Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate Weapons Under
International Humanitarian Law, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 85, 89 (2000).
' Federation of American Scientists: Military Analysis Network, CBU-87, http://www
.fas.orglman/dod-101/sys/dumb/cbu-87.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2008).196 AFTER-ACTION REPORT, supra note 189, at 90.
197 See Federation of American Scientists, supra note 195 (noting that the manufactured
claimed dud rate is 5 percent); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CLUSTER BOMBS IN AFGHANISTAN
1 (2001) [hereinafter CLUSTERBOMBS INAFGHANISTAN], available at http://www.hrw.org/
backgrounder/arms/cluster-bckl031.pdf (reporting that the United Nations Mine
Action Coordination Center found that the actual dud rate in Yugoslavia was 7 percent
for the CBU-87).
198 See AFTER-ACTION REPORT, supra note 189, at 90 (basing this number off the calculation
of 202 submunitions within each CBU-87 multiplied by 5% and 7% respectively).
'
99 CLUSTERBOMBS IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 197, at 4 (accounting only for the number
of cluster bombs dropped by the United States, and not the 665 cluster bombs dropped
by other nations with even higher dud rates).
200 Thomas M. McDonnell, Cluster Bombs Over Kosovo: A Violation of International Law?,
44 ARIZ. L. REV. 31, 54 (2002) (noting that these numbers are only as of January 2002).
201 These numbers are based on multiplying the number of CBU-87s dropped by the
number of bomblets in each CBU by the dud rate of the CBUs.202 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FATALLY FLAWED: CLUSTER BOMBS AND THEIR USE BY THE
UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN 23 (2002) [hereinafter FATALLY FLAWED], available at
httpJ/hrw.org/reports/2002/us-afghanistan/Afghanl2O2.pdf(discussing an attack intended
for Firqa that fell 1.3 kilometers away in the village of Qala Shater).20 See CLUSTER BOMBS IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 197, at 5 (noting that the U.N. Mine
Action Coordination Center found some cluster bombs buried as deep as fifty centimeters).
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eye, thereby creating thousands of virtual land mines that are unmarked
with an unknown location because of the inaccuracy of the weapon. °4
These virtual land mines are even more sensitive than actual land mines
and can be set off by a variety of factors including temperature variations,
extreme cold or heat, slight vibrations, or the use of a radio nearby.2 5 The
military confirms the danger of the unexploded ordnance in Brigadier
General John Craddock's statement, "'[In terms of unexploded ordnance,
a cluster bomb submunition] is probably the biggest danger in that it is so
fragile .... I don't know that the residents are aware of how dangerous
it is to even walk by that. [Walking by] could set it off.""'°6
Another danger associated with cluster bombs is their dispropor-
tionate killing of children.20 7 Cluster bombs are bright yellow, the size of
a soda can, and have a parachute on top which makes them appealing for
young children to pick up.20 The bright yellow color of the cluster bomb is
also the same color as the food packets distributed by the United States. °9
General Myers commented on the unfortunate similarity of colors in food
aid packages and cluster bombs:
[I]t is unfortunate that the cluster bombs, the unexploded
ones are the same color as the food packets. We have
dropped fliers that show the pictures and the proper lan-
guage explaining why you want to go to one and you don't
want to go to the other. We hope that helps. Another thing
we're doing is with the food packets is changing the color
24 See McDonnell, supra note 200, at 56 (discussing how cluster bomb duds act as land-
mines). See generally FATALLY FLAWED, supra note 202 (stating that cluster bombs can
fall significantly off target).205 Cluster Bombs the Legacy to Afghan Population, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, Jan. 18,
2002, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/ 9F2C42AA435
104B3C 1256B45005500FA).
206 See McDonnell, supra note 200, at 55 (quoting Paul Beaver, Unexploded Ordnance
Proves a Problem in Kosovo, 3 JANE'S MISSILES & RoCKETS, Aug. 1, 1999, § 8).
207 See Press Release, World Health Org., WHO Finds Heavy Toll from Land Mines in
Kosovo (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Heavy Toll], available at http://www.who.intlinf-pr-
1999/en/pr99-39.html (noting that 71 percent of the victims of unexploded cluster bombs
were under the age of 24).
20
' See Afghan Children at Risk From 24, 000 Unexploded Bomblets, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Dec. 21, 2001, available at http'//www.reliefweb.intrw/rwb.nsf/AUDocsByUNID/
C83417001BC835DBC1256B29004C5CAE.
209 CLUSTER BOMBS IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 197, at 2.
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of their design. We're going to-I think it's going to be blue.
It obviously will take some time .... They were probably
yellow because they were very visible and people could see
them lying around. The same for the cluster bombs. Un-
fortunately, they get used to running to yellow.21°
In addition to the tragic human consequences of cluster bombs,
their effect on the environment can be equally devastating.211 "They deny
access to farm and grazing land, pose a danger to livestock, impede access
to shelter and water, and delay rehabilitation of essential infrastructure
such as roads, bridges, and irrigation systems that are critical to a viable
national economy."2 12 A typical strike uses five cluster effect munitions,
which would result in an average of over thirty-five unexploded submu-
nitions.2 1' If these unexploded munitions were located in an agricultural
area or within a village, the fear of these munitions could effectively force
the villagers to abandon their homes because they have no way of knowing
if there are more or less than thirty-five unexploded bombs.2"4
The Defense Department is not ignorant of the dangers and prob-
lems cluster bombs create. During Operation Desert Storm, unexploded
submunitions killed twenty-five service personnel and directly hampered
the retaking of Kuwait International Airport.1 5 In January 2001, Secretary
of Defense William Cohen issued a directive to all service Secretaries
laying out the following:
Submunition weapons employment in Southwest Asia and
Kosovo, and major theater war modeling, have revealed a
significant unexploded ordnance (UXO) concern... It is the
policy of the DoD to reduce overall UXO through a process
of improvement in submunition system reliability-the
21" News Transcript, Dep't of Def., DoD News Briefing-Secretary Rumsfeld and General
Myers (Nov. 1, 2001), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx
?transcriptid=2636.
21 See Robert M. Augst, Environmental Damage Resulting From Operation Enduring
Freedom: Violations of International Law?, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,668,
10,670 (2003).
2121Id.
211 See McDonnell, supra note 200, at 57.
214 Id. at 57-58.
215 Thomas J. Herthel, On the Chopping Block: Cluster Munitions and the Law of War,
51 A.F. L. REV. 229, 240 (2001).
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desire is to field future submunitions with a 99% or higher
functioning rate.216
The services were given until fiscal year 2005 before future procurement
had to meet this standard and existing weapons could be used until
expended.217
As discussed, cluster bombs clearly create environmental damage
by denying the population's use of the environment.218 This damage can
last more than one year if the area is not cleared of unexploded mines, and
it clearly threatens human life, which would bring it under the proposed
modifications to the Foreign Claims Act. The need to properly account for
and internalize the true cost of using cluster bombs is even more pressing
than the Pancevo example because of their widespread use.219 Not only do
these weapons affect the citizens of the countries where they are dropped,
but they are responsible for the deaths of twenty-five United States
Soldiers during the Persian Gulf War. Of these twenty-five casualties,
seven were trained mine clearance personnel who died attempting to
clear these weapons from an airfield in the middle of the day.22°
Unlike the case of target selection,221 the proposed modifications
would likely have a preemptory effect against the use of cluster bombs.
The United States must face the seemingly improbable decision to use
cluster bombs against targets, face a widespread long-term cleanup,222 and
risk the very lives of the military members it intends to protect through
the use of these weapons.223 In addition to risking lives, the United States
would likely face a high cost and long effort to locate and destroy the un-
exploded submunitions.224 Faced with these decisions, it seems much more
21 6 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Cohen to the Secretaries of the Military Depart-
ments, Regarding DoD Policy on Submunition Reliability (Jan. 10, 2001), reprinted in
DEP'T OF DEF., DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON MUNITIONS SYSTEM app. 111 (2005)
[hereinafter Secretary Cohen Memorandum], available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/
reports/2005-09-MSRReport%20_Final.pdf.
217Id.
218 See Augst, supra note 211, at 10,670.
219 See McDonnell, supra note 200, at 54.
220 See id. at 56.
221 See supra Part IV.B.1.
222 See McDonnell, supra note 200, at 54.
223 See id. at 56 (noting that the limited cleanup efforts of cluster bombs that the United
States already attempted resulted in the death of seven specially trained unexploded
ordnance soldiers).
224 See id. at 54.
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probable that the United States would take the path already chosen by
Secretary Cohen 2 5 and improve the reliability of cluster munitions. The
savings would be immense, including American lives,226 foreign citizen
lives,227 environmental damage,22 and public relations.229 Finally, enacting
the legislation change would likely force the United States to select more
reliable weapons and hold the manufacturer accountable for the weapons
dud rate to prevent the aforementioned problems.
3. Use of Depleted Uranium
Uranium has three general usable forms: naturally occurring
uranium, enriched uranium, and depleted uranium.230 The World Health
Organization provides an excellent summary of naturally occurring
uranium:
Uranium is a naturally occurring metal that consists of
three radioactive isotopes: U238, U235 and U234. The
concentration by weight is approximately 98.3% U238,
0.72% U235 and 0.006% U234. Uranium is ubiquitous in
the environment. It occurs in all rocks and soil. A typical
concentration of U238, the main isotope, in the earth's
crust is between 0.5 to 10 gram/t.2 31
Depleted uranium is a waste product created when naturally
occurring uranium is refined to extract the U-235 from the metal.232 This
process is completed by superheating the uranium into a gas and
passing it through a series of centrifuges to separate out the lighter
U235.2 33 The enriched U-235 is known as "enriched uranium" and can be
used in commercial or military reactors, or as fuel for nuclear weapons.234
225 See Secretary Cohen Memorandum, supra note 216.
221 See McDonnell, supra note 200, at 56.
227 See Heavy Toll, supra note 207.
228 See Augst, supra note 211, at 10,670.
229 See generally FATALLY FLAWED, supra note 202 (criticizing the use of cluster bombs).
230 WORLD HEALTH ORG., DEPLETED URANIUM MISSION TO Kosovo 6 (2001) [hereinafter
DEPLETED URANIUM MISSION], available at http://www.who.int/ionizing-radiation/pub
_meet/en/ReportWHO-depleteduraniumEng.pdf.
231 Id.
232 Id.
2 33 Robert Thompson, Radioactive Warfare: Depleted Uranium Weapons, the Environment,
and International Law, 36 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,474, 10,475 (2006).
234 id.
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When the process is complete, the waste product is known as depleted
uranium because the U-235 is depleted from .72% to .25% of the total mass
and the remaining material is only "about 60% [sic] as radioactive as
natural uranium."235
In 1999, the Department of Energy estimated that the United
States had 739,000 metric tons of depleted uranium and continues to
produce approximately 30,000 metric tons every year.236 Depleted uranium
is extremely dense, which creates a variety of commercial applications
including counterweights in sailboats, aircraft, and as shielding from X-
rays.23v Additionally, the United States Military and other countries use
the metal for armor piercing rounds.238
The United States Military and its allies' use of depleted uranium
has been a source of controversy since the First Gulf War.239 Critics have
linked the use of depleted uranium to the Gulf War Syndrome affecting
over 250,000 American Gulf War veterans, to the death of 1.5 million Iraqi
soldiers and civilians since the Gulf War, and to an alarming increase in
"[1]eukemia, cancer, birth defects and rare diseases" in Iraq. a° Iraqi scien-
tists identified elevated levels of U-238 in the Tigris River, in the drinking
water of various cities, and in vegetables, fish and meat.24'
Independent sources confirm that depleted uranium can contami-
nate the environment in a number of ways.242 Dangers include immediate
235 DEPLETED URANIUM MISSION, supra note 230, at 6.
236 DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENVTL. SCIENCE DIV., DOE/EIS-0269, FINAL PROGRAMMATIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR THE LONG-TERM
MANAGEMENT AND USE OF DU HEXAFLOURIDE S-2 (2004), available at http://web.ead.anl
.gov/uranium/pdf/summary.pdf; Henryk Bern & Firyal Bou-Rabee, Environmental and
Health Consequences of DU Use in the 1991 Gulf War, 30 ENV'T INT'L 123, 124 (2004),
available at http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/academics/courses/595E/Session%207/BemEnv&
HealthConseq.pdf.
237 DEPLETED URANIUM MISSION, supra note 230, at 6.
238 James Naughton, Department of Defense, Briefing by James Naughton & Michael
Kilpatrick on Depleted Uranium (Mar. 14, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink
.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2058.
2 9 See Haavisto, supra note 10, at 573-83; Thompson, supra note 233, at 10,476; Damacio
A. Lopez, Director, International DU Study Team, The Case for an Immediate Ban on the
Military Use of Depleted Uranium, Presented at a Meeting of the European Parliament
in Brussels, Belgium (June 10, 2003) [hereinafter Lopez Presentation], available at http'/
www.grip.org/bdg/g1035.html.
24 Lopez Presentation, supra note 239.
241 Id.
242 See The Health Hazards of DU Munitions, Part II, THE ROYAL SOCIETY, Mar., 2002, at
19-26 [hereinafter THE ROYAL SOCIETY II], available at http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/display
pagedoc.asp?id=11498; Thompson, supra note 233, at 10,476.
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aerial movement of the depleted uranium after the initial impact of the
explosive, subsequent leakage of the uranium into the soil and transpor-
tation by plants, animals, or microbes, and migration of uranium into sur-
face or ground water.243 The most dangerous exposure occurs immediately
after impact when depleted uranium particles can be inhaled into the
lungs.2 " In worst case scenarios, this could lead to kidney failure within
a few days.245 An additional acute risk of exposure can occur when children
play near an impact site or handle a depleted uranium round.246 More
widespread and long-term contamination can occur if depleted uranium
reaches a water supply where it will remain indefinitely, thereby exposing
the population to radiological and toxic risks.247
The United States Military downplays these risks as relatively
insignificant.2' First, the effects in Iraq are expressly denounced because
the primary source of the information was Saddam Hussein's govern-
ment.249 Colonel James Naughton eloquently hypothesizes in a Defense
Department briefing on depleted uranium that:
The Iraqis tell us terrible things happened to our people
because you used it last time. Why do they want it to go
away? They want it to go away because we kicked the crap
out of them-okay? I mean, there's no doubt that DU gave
us a huge advantage over their tanks. They lost a lot of
tanks. Their soldiers can't be really amused at the idea of
going out in basically the same tanks with some slight
improvements and taking on Abrams again. That has got
to be a huge morale-so wouldn't it be great if we could
convince the world to make the U.S. give up DU?...
Department of Defense studies of ninety soldiers with significant exposure
to depleted uranium due to friendly fire show no cases of cancer or kidney
failure thirteen years after the exposure.25' The military also points out
243 THE ROYAL SOCIETY II, supra note 242, at 21-23.
244 Id. at 24.
245 Id. at ix.
246 Id. at x, 24.
247 See Thompson, supra note 233, at 10,476.
248 See Naughton, supra note 238.
249 See id.
250 Id.
251 Id.
2008] 577
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
that depleted uranium is 40% less radioactive than naturally occurring
uranium that the general population is exposed to everyday.252 Lastly,
studies of uranium refiners show no increased risk of cancer associated
with the long-term handling of natural uranium.253
Independent sources support the military's contention that the
risks from exposure are generally minimal. Although depleted uranium
can corrode and pollute local water sources, the expected increased risk of
cancer due to depleted uranium is one person per million or lower.25 4 The
increased risk for kidney failure is similarly low except for worst-case
scenarios. World Health Organization studies on the effects of depleted
uranium after its use in Kosovo show no significant impact on the envi-
ronment.2 56 The study points out that even if seventy-two kilograms of
depleted uranium were absorbed at a site with none escaping, the average
uranium content of the soil would only increase by 5%.257
Based on the reports of the United Nations Environment
Programme,25 the World Health Organization,2 59 and the United States'
own data,26 ° it does not appear that depleted uranium poses a serious
environmental risk. The proposed modification to the Foreign Claims Act
would minimally affect the United States Military's use of depleted ura-
nium. The one scenario where the use of depleted uranium should be
monitored is when it is used near a water source.261 Members of the
Armed Forces should be mindful not to use depleted uranium weapons
near a water source, but they obviously cannot always control when and
where they engage the enemy. This would likely mean that the proposed
legislation would rarely affect depleted uranium use, and it would be
primarily retroactive as a humanitarian effort to provide clean water to
a town with radioactively polluted water.262
252 id.
25 DEPLETED URANIUM MISSION, supra note 230, at 10.
254 THE ROYAL SOCIETY II, supra note 242, at x.
25 5 Id.
256 DEPLETED URANIUM MISSION, supra note 230, at 26, 29 (concurring with the Royal
Society Study that the danger of depleted uranium is remote).257 Id. at 28.
258 See U.N. ENv'T PROGRAMME, DEPLETED URANIUM IN Kosovo: POST-CONFLICT
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 34-36 (2001), available at http://postconflict.unep.ch/
publications/uranium.pdf.259 See DEPLETED URANIUM MISSION, supra note 230, at 25-31.
210 See Naughton, supra note 238.
261 See DEPLETED URANIUM MISSION, supra note 230, at 30-31, 33.
262 See generally id.
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CONCLUSION
Environmental damage has been a certainty in warfare throughout
history and remains an issue today. Although some environmental damage
is inevitable, recent conflicts have demonstrated the ability of the United
States and its allies to choose targets and strike them at will with the
weapon of their choosing,263 thereby limiting environmental damage.
Although the United States has the ability to limit environmental
damage during conflict, there is little legal framework for the United States
to exercise this restraint. International law does provides a framework
for identifying when environmental damage is excessive through the
lense of necessity, proportionality, humanity, and distinction; however,
the United States is unlikely to submit to international jurisdiction for an
environmental claim for damages or a criminal claim against a member
of the armed forces.
Although the United States has little incentive to submit to
international jurisdiction, there is evidence from recent conflicts that the
United States could benefit from more careful scrutiny of the long-term
environmental consequences of its targets and ordnance. One possible
means of providing this scrutiny and forcing the Department of Defense
to internalize the long-term costs of environmental damage is by modifying
the Foreign Claims Act. This Act already permits international claimants
to recover for accidental damage caused by members of the Department
of Defense as long as the claimants are friendly to the United States and
the damage does not result directly or indirectly from combat operations.
A proposed modification is to allow claimants to recover for environmental
damage lasting more than one year and posing a significant risk to human
life. This proposed modification is a balance between over-compensating
for every crater on the battlefield and the current situation of under-
compensating and creating extensive environmental damage on the
battlefield.
Ultimately, expanding the Foreign Claims Act to compensate for
long-term environmental damage would go a long way toward achieving
the ultimate goal of the Foreign Claims Act: "[t]o promote and to main-
263 See generally Nato Leadership Splits Revealed, supra note 182 (demonstrating that
during the bombing of Serbia, NATO had the unfettered ability to choose when and where
to strike).
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tain friendly relations" with other countries. 26' The United States would
hold manufacturers of ordnance to stricter standards and abandon its
fire-and-forget mentality. As evidenced, this modification could help save
the lives of its own Armed Forces. 265 Additionally, commanders would
select targets with the long-term environmental consequences to the
surrounding population clearly in mind and would not depend on third-
party countries for the cleanup. Finally, the modification would give the
military commanders on the ground more flexibility to compensate and
clean up affected areas, thereby improving relationships and security. 6
Ultimately, the question of expanding the Foreign Claims Act to
protect the environment of foreign countries is up to the discretion of the
United States Congress. It requires leadership in Congress to recognize
that the United States should be a world leader in protecting the environ-
ment, and not simply pass the environmental costs of warfare along to
other countries. As the largest economic and military power in the world,
the United States must act as a model for the free world in protecting
foreign citizens and their environments during war.
24 Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (West Supp. 2007).
265 See Herthel, supra note 215, at 239-40.
266 See Zorpette, supra note 128.
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